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I. Introduction 
A t common law, "an employment contract of indefinite duration, that is, at will, can be legally ter-
minated at the pleasure of either party at 
any time." 1 In spite of their proclaimed in-
tent to enforce the time-worn axiom, Mary-
land's appellate courts have recognized 
that, under the appropriate circumstances, 
a former at will employee can state a cause 
of action in contract against the employer 
who terminated him.2 With the recogni-
tion of these claims will soon come the un-
enviable task of determining what the for-
mer employee's damages should be. 
This article addresses a small fraction of 
the issues raised in the opening paragraph: 
the employer's exposure to damages for lost 
future wages. Constructing the proper for-
mula for calculating this exposure begins 
with a recognition that at will employment 
is a unique contractual relationship that 
merits special treatment. Next, a number 
of the principles that govern awards of 
damages in contract actions, and damage 
awards in general, are examined in an ef-
fort to determine the proper elements of 
the formula. Lastly, the formula is applied 
to the breach of an at will employment 
co.ntract to demonstrate that lost future 
wages should not be recoverable. 
II. Employment at Will 
In spite of the recent chinks in its armor, 
the employment at will doctrine is alive 
and well in Mary1and. 3 Under this rule of 
the workplace, an employee hired for an 
indefinite duration can be fired at any time, 
for any reason. Thus, it carries with it no 
promises of job security or tenure, or that 
dismissal will only be for cause.4 This, the 
most common employment relationship, 
should be contrasted from its two counter-
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parts: the contract for a fixed duration, and 
more importantly, the life employment 
contract. 
The contract for a fixed duration is pre-
cisely what its name implies. Along with 
its guarantee offixed tenure, it carries with 
it an implied covenant that the employee 
will only be discharged for cause. 5 Because 
of these guarantees, the courts have held 
that an employee who is unlawfully dis-
missed before the end of his term can re-
cover for the lost future wages that would 
have been paid until the end of that period. 6 
A life employment contract is also self 
defining. It is the complete surrender by 
the employer of the right to discharge an 
employee, except for cause, for the re-
mainder of the employee's life. 7 Because 
this imports serious consequences, the 
Maryland judiciary has placed two signifi-
cant hurdles in the paths of would be life 
employees. First, it must appear that the 
employee's duties and salary are set forth 
in the agreementS in terms that are "fixed 
and definite, with little or no room for mis-
understanding." 9 Thus, unlike the at will 
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employee whose tenure and wages are al-
ways subject to change, the life employer 
and employee must fix all the terms of 
their bargain at the outset; nothing can be 
left for future negotiation. 
Second, special consideration must have 
been surrendered by the employee in ex-
change for the promise oflife tenure. 10 This 
consideration must be in addition to the 
"services incident to the employment." 11 
Thus, merely remaining on the job after 
being guaranteed life tenure is insufficient 
consideration for a guarantee of permanent 
employment. 12 Moreover, resigning a job 
or incurring a detriment in preparation for 
accepting a position do not qualify as ade-
quate consideration. 13 Rather, there must 
be an independent detriment or benefit, 
such as surrendering a personal injury 
claim, to qualify as adequate considera-
tion.14 
When the parties have gone through the 
rigors of forming a life employment con-
tract, and the employer unlawfully fires 
the employee, future wages are a proper 
element of damages. 15 These damages can 
be measured by resorting to an actuarial 
table or by compensating the employee as 
though he had worked until retirement. 16 
III. Contract Damages 
The mere breach of a contract by one 
party does not automatically entitle the 
nonbreaching party to compensation for 
all his losses. Instead, a number of rules 
have been formulated over time to limit 
the breaching party's exposure to liability. 
These theories are not only supported by 
stare decisis l7 but by economics as well. 
The economic argument for limiting the 
exposure for a breach of contract is known 
as the efficient breach hypothesis. 18 This 
theory presupposes that it is economically 
advantageous for consumers if the manu-
facturers and suppliers of goods and ser-
vices can escape unprofitable bargains. 19 
In other words, society as a whole benefits 
when an unprofitable deal is forsaken for a 
profitable one. 
A. Expectation Damages 
The hallmark of the efficient breach 
hypothesis is the notion that the injured 
party is entitled to claim the benefit of his 
bargain,21 or the difference between what 
was promised and what he actually received. 
Thus, other than the amorality of repudiat-
ing a bargain, an efficient breach benefits 
all concerned. The breaching party and so-
ciety as a whole obtain the benefit of the ef-
ficient breach, and the non-breaching party 
receives his profit. 22 
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Although it has yet to articulate an effi-
cient breach argument in support of its 
decisions, the Maryland judiciary has con-
sistently held that a contract plaintiff is en-
titled to the benefit of his bargain, his an-
ticipated gain. 23 The benefit of the bargain 
rule serves not only as a tool for determin-
ing the plaintiff's damage, but it also serves 
to limit his recovery to his anticipated gain. 
B. Consequential Damages 
Although damages are confined to the 
expectation interest, the non-defaulting 
party can also recover consequential dam-
ages. 24 But, just as it does with benefit of 
the bargain damages, the law of contracts 
presupposes that the parties have devel-
oped a mutual expectancy of the conse-
quences of their breach. Hence, only those 
consequential damages that were reason-
ably foreseeable to all parties at the time 
of contracting can be recovered. 25 Conse-
quences or contingencies known only to 
one party are not proper elements of dam-
age. Of course, if one party notifies the 
other party at the time of contracting that 
there are unique consequences, the other-
wise unforeseeable consequences can be-
come a proper element of damages. 26 
C. Mitigation 
As a further limitation on damages, the 
law of contracts does not allow the injured 
party to sit idly by while his damages mul-
tiply. Rather, it imposes upon him two ab-
solute duties. The first, known as the doc-
trine of avoidable harms, requires that the 
injured party make reasonable efforts to 
avoid aggravating his damages. 27 The sec-
ond requires that he make reasonable ef-
forts to mitigate or reduce his damages. 28 
Because avoidable damages and mitigation 
are viewed as a defensive issue, the burden 
of raising and proving the facts is on the 
defendant. 29 
In the area of employment contracting, 
the duty to mitigate is quite strict. It re-
quires that the former employee accept com-
parable employment at a comparable rate 
of pay "in the same or similar business." 30 
Although a failure to mitigate is not fatal to 
a former employee's claim, any recovery 
he would have recovered will be reduced 
by the amount of money that he would have 
earned, had he taken reasonable efforts to 
find suitable employment.31 As the defen-
dant, the employer has the burden of pro v-
ing these mitigating factors. 32 
D. Punitive Damagesl 
Emotional Suffering 
Lastly, in a further effort to confine 
damage to the terms of the contract, the 
courts have determined that punitive dam-
ages33 and damages for emotional distress 
are not recoverable in contract actions. 34 
The absolute ban on punitive damages in 
contract actions is perhaps the supreme 
triumph of the efficient breach hypothesis. 
Fearing that exposure to punitive damages 
will deter parties from breaching inefficient 
agreements,35 the Maryland judiciary has 
determined that the punitive and deterrent 
policies that justify awarding punitive 
damages in general, must be forsaken in 
contract actions. 36 
IV. The Law of Damages 
in General 
Over the years, a number of limitations 
have been developed to guide all efforts to 
recover damages. Primarily, these limita-
tions hold the injured party to the burden 
of establishing the nature and extent of his 
loss. In other words, these are not policy-
based theories, but standards of proof that 
all plaintiffs must clear before a finding of 
fact will be allowed awarding them dam-
ages. 
A. Reasonable Certainty 
Before any element of damages can be 
placed before the finder off act, it must ap-
pear that its amount has been established 
with reasonable certainty,31 Under this 
standard of proof, mathematical precision 
is not required. 38 Rather, the plaintiff need 
only prove a reasonable basis for determin-
ing the extent of his loss. In short, he must 
show something more than losses based on 
mere speculation or conjecture.39 More-
over, even when the damages are uncertain 
the courts have recognized that a defendant 
whose breach has "caused a difficulty of 
proving damage . . . cannot complain of 
the resulting uncertainty." 40 
In cases where the rule of certainty is 
fatal to the plaintiff's expectation interest, 
the courts have recognized that he is enti-
tled to recover reliance damages.41 These 
are the total sums expended by the plain-
tiffin preparation to and in performance of 
the contract, less, of course, any renumera-
tion received from the breaching party.42 
B. Lost Profits 
Combining many of the rules of contract 
law and the test of reasonable certainty, 
the courts have developed a formalized ap-
proach to claims for lost profits. These 
claims must assert that the defendant's 
breach caused the loss of profit, and that 
the defendant should have reasonably 
foreseen at the time of contracting that the 
loss of profits would probably result from 
a breach. 43 Of course, the lost profits must 
be proven to a reasonable certainty. 44 
In meeting this test of certainty, plaintiffs 
have been allowed to project their lost fu-
ture profits from past performance of a 
business.45 These projections are only 
permitted when there is a sufficient his-
tory of profit from which a projection can 
be drawn.46 
C. Future Harm 
There is no presumption of the perma-
nancy of an injury. 47 Thus, the party claim-
ing future harm must offer some basis for 
concluding that a condition caused by the 
defendant's wrongdoing is unlikely to 
change.48 This requires proof that there be 
greater than fifty percent chance that fu-
ture injury will occur. 49 In some instances, 
this can be accomplished by proof testi-
mony of the injury itself. 50 These cases, 
however, are limited to instances where the 
injury itself is outwardly, visibly perma-
nent. 5! Any other injury requires expert 
testimony supporting its permanency. 52 
Although the opinion of the expert can be 
cast in general terms, it must appear that 
there is an appropriate foundation to sup-
port his conclusion that the injury is a per-
manent one. 53 A permanent injury must 
be contrasted from the suffering in the fu-
ture. Apparently, a lesser standard of proof 
is required when intangible future suffer-
ing is in issue, but the cases applying this 
reduced standard of certainty have thus far 
involved only tort claims for intangible 
losses. 54 
Analysis 
To qualify as an element of damages in a 
suit for breach of an at will employment 
contract, a claim for lost future wages must 
survive the gauntlet of rules set forth in the 
previous section. Not only must it satisfy 
the economic and legal qualifications im-
posed by the law of contracts, but it must 
also meet the standards of proof required 
to generate an issue offact. Accordingly, it 
must be sifted through each element of the 
formula. 
A. The Law of Contracts 
Under Maryland's at will employment 
doctrine, the only certainty that the parties 
have created is uncertainty. As a matter of 
law, they have created a relationship in 
which neither party can count on the other's 
future performance. In the words of the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland, their rela-
tionship "can be terminated at the pleasure 
of either party at any time." 55 Thus, the 
benefit of the bargain is only that the em-
ployer will pay the employee for time actu-
ally worked. 56 
At least one jurisdiction, however, has 
awarded lost future wages, reasoning that, 
but for the defendant's breach, the em-
ployee would have remained on the job 
until retirement,51 To allow damages for 
lost future wages for the breach of an at will 
employment contract is to engage in noth-
ing less than a wholesale judicial rewriting 
of the contract forged by the parties. Had 
they wished to secure the employee's ten-
ure, they could have contracted for a fixed 
period or entered into a life employment 
contract. But they chose, instead, to select 
employment for an indefinite term, a rela-
tionship that, as a matter oflaw, promises 
no security. In other words, if lost future 
wages become an element of damages, the 
at will employment contract will be trans-
formed into a life employment contract, in 
direct contravention of the parties' expec-
tation and intent. 58 
Not only does a recovery of lost future 
wages in an employment at will case per-
mit a party a benefit that he never bargained 
for, but it severely inhibits the employer's 
ability to breach the contract with economic 
efficiency. Faced with the prospect ofhav-
ing to pay an employee the wages he would 
otherwise earn over his lifetime with the 
company, only the foolhardiest employer 
would terminate any employee other than 
according to the terms of the contract. And 
since dismissal for cause is the only ground 
for lawfully terminating the contract, a 
more efficient or better qualified employee 
could not be substituted for an employee 
who has not committed a grave enough act 
of misconduct to warrant his dismissal for 
cause. 59 Accordingly, not only is the em-
ployer saddled with the cost of the less effi-
cient employee, but consumers who pur-
chase the goods and services produced by 
the employee are equally burdened. 
B. The Law of Damages 
Even iflost future wages can be deemed 
an element of damages for the loss of at will 
employment, it is difficult to conceive of 
how this loss should be measured. Under a 
simplistic approach applied by several fed-
eral courts in so called "front pay" decisions, 
it is possible to look to the employee's wages 
before the breach and after the breach. 60 
Also, the sales made by retained brokers 
and salesmen have been used to extrapolate 
how a former broker or salesman would 
have performed, but for the employer's 
breach of duty. 6! This same theory could 
conceivably be used to predict how a ter-
minated employee would have performed, 
had he remained with his employer. Lastly, 
actuarial tables or a mandatory retirement 
age could be consulted to fix the duration 
of the 10ss.62 
Under Maryland's 
at will employment 
doctrine, the only 
certainty that the 
parties have created 
is uncertainty. 
1. Amount of Damages: The fal-
lacy of these theories is that they are based 
on a series of fictions, compiled of com-
pounded "what if's." First, there is the as-
sumption that the employee would have 
served the remainder of his career with the 
company. Not only is this assumption re-
butted by the mobility of the modern work-
force, but it flies in the face of the at will 
employment doctrine's no-tenure policy. 
Second, all three theories assume that, 
had the employee remained with the com-
pany, he would have been the recipient of 
salary increases and promotions accorded 
his co-workers. In cases where salary in-
creases were given automatically, perhaps 
the employer's post termination conduct 
can serve as a guide for measuring what the 
lost future wages should be. Also, while it 
is plausible that a former employee's un-
blemished record arguably supports the 
inference that he would have received 
merit increases given to other employees, 
it is sheer speculation to assume that pro-
motions actually would have been forth-
coming, especially when the employer 
thought so little of the employee's services 
that he fired him. Merit raises and promo-
tions are generally the product of the indi-
vidual's qualities. Thus, comparisons be-
tween employees is based on the flawed 
notion that all employees perform equally. 
Even if these postulations could serve as 
a basis for fixing a dollar amount, the effect 
of the mitigation requirement has yet to be 
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considered. As previously indicated, the law 
of contracts will not allow the terminated 
employee to sit idly by for the remainder 
of his career. The effect of the mitigation 
requirement is that it guarantees that the 
lost future wages claim will be something 
less than the amount of wages that would 
have been paid for the remainder of the 
employee's life. The "front pay" decisions 
seize upon mitigation as an important check 
on unreasonably high verdicts. 63 These 
decisions, however, decline to explain pre-
cisely how the employee's performance at 
his new job can be predicted with any de-
gree of certainty. Surely, Maryland's law 
oflost profits would bar the projection of 
future profit where there is no past perfor-
mance at the new job from which to project 
the future loss. At worst, the employer's 
inability to prove mitigation would pre-
clude his use of that defense. At best, the 
speculations built into approximating lost 
future wages would be compounded by 
the employer's baseless speculations. 
Also, the proof oflost future wages and 
mitigation are based on the false premise 
that the disparity proven at trial will never 
change. Perhaps, with the new employ-
ment opportunity will come better oppor-
tunities, perhaps not. But there is no ra-
tional basis for guessing what the future 
will hold. 
2. Duration of Injury: The specu-
lative assumptions outlined above ignore 
the element of duration. To recover pro-
spective relief, the former employee must 
show that his injury will continue into the 
future. Some courts respond to this prob-
lem by arguing that the law of personal in-
jury can be used to fix the duration oflost 
future wages. 64 While Maryland allows 
lost future wages in personal injury cases, 
it must appear. that the injury has some 
permanency. 65 Perhaps the most glaringly 
erroneous assumption of all is that the em-
ployee's situation will remain unchanged 
over the remainder of his career. In other 
words, the loss of one job is transformed 
into a permanent disability, without proof 
that the loss of employment will have defi-
nite future consequences. Unlike the unre-
pairable loss of a hand or foot, the law of 
employment contracting imposes upon the 
employee the affirmative duty of healing 
his wounds and moving on to another em-
ployer. Therefore, the assumption that the 
employee will remain disabled for the re-
mainder of his professional career is as un-
supported by the law and by the realities of 
the job market. 
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V. Conclusion 
Although some states have opted to al-
low awards for lost future wages for the 
breach of an at will employment contract, 
Maryland should side with those jurisdic-
tions that have rejected these claims. The 
bases for rejecting such claims are not lim-
ited to their speculative nature. 
Confining the support behind the rejec-
tion to lack of proof would surely produce 
two criticisms. First, that the wrongdoer is 
allowed to escape liability because he was 
fortunate enough to inflict an incalculable 
injury. Second, that lost future wages 
should at least be awarded until the close 
of trial. This second solution would cer-
tainly cure the uncertainty and duration 
problems. 
To avoid these issues, it is wisest to con-
front the lost future wages issue for its in-
consistency with established principles of 
contract law. By definition, at will em-
ployment creates only the expectation of 
what its name implies: no guarantee offu-
ture employment is reserved or promised. 
Thus, the employee's expectation interest, 
which the law of contract strives to com-
pensate, extends only to being compen-
sated for time served. 
Thus, while claims for lost future wages 
attributable to the breach of an at will em-
ployment contract are nothing less than the 
guesses of the parties' witnesses and ex-
perts, the speculative damages issue need 
not be reached. As a matter of contract law, 
lost future wages are not a proper element 
of damage. 
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